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PREVIEW—Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC: 




The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in this 
matter on Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 9:30 AM in the courtroom of 
the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Building, Helena, 
Montana. The Honorable Olivia Rieger will hear the case in place of 
Justice Jim Rice, who recused himself. Eric B. Wolff is expected to argue 
for the Appellants. Harlan B. Krogh is expected to argue for the Appellees. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This case presents a unique property law issue at the center of a 
long-running dispute over the ownership of multiple valuable dinosaur 
fossils. As surface estate owners, Appellees claim sole ownership of the 
fossils, while Appellants argue the fossils belong to the mineral estate. 
After a series of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has certified to the Montana Supreme Court the question of 
“[w]hether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils constitute ‘minerals’ for 
the purpose of a mineral reservation?”1 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2005, Jerry and Robert Severson sold the surface rights and 
one-third of the mineral estate of their Garfield County ranch to Lige and 
Mary Ann Murray (the “Murrays”). The Seversons and Murrays owned 
the remaining two-thirds of the mineral estate as tenants-in-common.2 The 
mineral deed stated that the parties would share “all right title and interest 
in and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, 
and that may be produced from the [ranch].”3 At the time of the sale, 
neither party knew of or suspected the presence of dinosaur fossils on the 
ranch.4 
Shortly after the sale, an amateur paleontologist discovered 
several valuable fossils on the ranch, including a nearly-intact 
Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton, as well as the “Dueling Dinosaurs,” a two-
part fossil containing a 22-foot-long theropod and a 28-foot-long 
 
*  Layne Ryerson, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School 
of Law at the University of Montana. 
1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2019) [hereinafter Certification Order]. 
2.  Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 
1203, 1205 (D. Mont. 2016) [hereinafter Murray I].  
3. Id. (citing Dep. Mary Ann Murray 30:3–31:8, Doc. 48-4 at 
5–6 (2016)). 
4. Id. 
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ceratopsian locked in combat.5 Experts considered the fossils (collectively 
the “Montana Fossils”) highly valuable, with the Tyrannosaurus rex 
skeleton fetching several million dollars from a Dutch museum.6 
In 2014, the Murrays filed suit in Montana state court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Jerry and Robert Seversons and their assignees, 
BEJ Minerals, LLC and RTWF, LLC (collectively the “Seversons”), had 
no interest in the Montana Fossils because they belonged to the owner of 
the surface estate.7 The Seversons removed the case to federal court based 
on diversity and counterclaimed, seeking reimbursement for the 
ownership and sale of the Montana Fossils, which they argued were part 
of the mineral estate.8 
The federal district court granted summary judgment for the 
Murrays, determining that the Montana Fossils did not fall within the 
"ordinary and natural meaning" of the word "mineral" as used in the deed.9 
The district court noted that the fossils were not mined in a traditional 
sense but rather discovered by good fortune.10 Moreover, the fossils were 
deemed valuable based on specimen, preservation, and species, rather than 
their mineral composition.11 Finally, unlike minerals, the fossils did not 
require further refinement to become valuable; their value stemmed 
exclusively from their discovery.12  
The Seversons appealed, and a three-judge panel of the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.13 The Ninth Circuit determined that Montana had 
adopted the test used by the Texas Supreme Court in Heinatz v. Allen;14 
therefore, substances which are both composed of minerals and deemed 
rare and exceptional belong to the mineral estate.15 Because the Montana 
Fossils were technically composed of minerals and considered rare and 
exceptional, the Ninth Circuit found they belonged to the mineral estate 
owners.16 In response to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the Montana 
Legislature unanimously passed House Bill 229, a bill clarifying that 
fossils belong to the owner of the surface estate.17 
 
5. Id. at 1205–06 (citing Dep. Peter Larson 131:10, Doc. 48-4 
at 141 (2016)). 
6. Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1205–07; Murray v. BEJ 
Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Murray II]. 
7.  Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
8.    Id. at 1212. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. at 1207. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Murray II, 908 F.3d at 448. 
14.      217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949).  
15.      Murray II, 908 F. 3d at 447.  
16.      Id. 
17.     H.B. 229, 66th Leg. (Mont. 2019) (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 
1–4–112, 82–1–501 (2019)). 
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The Murrays petitioned for rehearing en banc, which the Ninth 
Circuit granted.18 The Ninth Circuit then certified to the Montana Supreme 
Court the question of “whether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils 
constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose of a mineral reservation.”19 The Court 
accepted the question but reserved the option to reformulate pending full 
consideration of the issue.20 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A.  Appellants’ Arguments 
The Seversons argue three main points. First, that the Court has 
adopted the Heinatz test and should apply it on a case-by-case basis.21 
Second, the passing of H.B. 229 has no bearing on the case and the Court 
should not take it consideration.22 Third, the Murrays’ public policy 
arguments against the inclusion of fossils in the mineral estate lack merit.23  
 
1.  Heinatz Test 
 
The Seversons argue that the Court has already adopted the 
Heinatz test and applied it on numerous occasions to determine whether a 
substance qualifies as a mineral for the purposes of a mineral estate.24 
Under the test, if a substance both qualifies as a mineral in the natural and 
ordinary sense of the word and is deemed rare and exceptional, it belongs 
to the mineral estate.25 When applying the test, however, the Seversons 
urge the Court to focus on the “rare and exceptional” criteria, rather than 
the “natural and ordinary” meaning, to determine mineral classification.26 
The Seversons argue that the Court has never relied on dictionary or 
statutory definitions to determine if a substance is a mineral.27 
 Next, the Seversons rely on the facts from the Ninth Circuit’s 
certification order to show that the Montana Fossils qualify as minerals 
under the Heinatz test.28 According to the order, the Montana Fossils are 
both mineral in composition, as well as rare and valuable.29 The Seversons 
dismiss the contention that the Montana Fossils were once composed of 
 
18.  Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 
2019).  
19. Certification Order, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019). 
20.  Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 2383604, at *1 (Mont. June 
4, 2019). 
21.    Appellants’ Br. at 9, July 7, 2019, No. OP 19-0304; 
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4, Aug. 14, 2019, No. OP 19-0304 
22.      Appellants’ Br. at 22–24. 
23.     Id. at 24–27. 
24.  Id. at 9. 
25.  Id. 
26. Id. at 14–15.  
27.   Id. 
28.  Id. 
29. Id. (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074). 
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organic matter, noting that substances like gas and oil, which are 
commonly considered part of the mineral estate, also derive from living 
organisms.30 Additionally, the Seversons deflect concerns that the Heinatz 
test would apply to other types of bones.31 While fossils are completely 
mineral in composition, bones merely contain minerals.32 
The Seversons point to previous cases where the Court utilized the 
Heinatz test. In Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Company, 
the Court applied the Heinatz test to scoria.33 The Court determined that 
scoria was neither rare nor valuable, even though it could be sold 
commercially.34 Next, in Hart v. Craig, the Court determined that 
sandstone’s use in road construction did not make it rare and exceptional 
for the sake of the test.35 The Seversons assert that these decisions show 
the Heinatz test is established precedent in Montana and should be applied 
to the Montana Fossils.36 
Further, the Seversons argue that the Heinatz test appropriately 
makes determinations on a case-by-case basis.37 A “sweeping categorical” 
test, meanwhile, would incorrectly place value on certain minerals despite 
their low quantity or difficult accessibility.38 The Seversons argue that a 
case-by-case methodology will not be overly burdensome and point to 
federal mining laws which also determine ownership on a situational 
basis.39 According to the Seversons, the Heinatz test also provides 
“predictability” because it recognizes that the purpose of a mineral estate 
is to convey all valuable mineral substances to the mineral owner.40 If 
parties wish to create an agreement outside this framework, they can 
contract accordingly.41 Therefore, the Seversons urge the Court to observe 
stare decisis and continue applying the Heinatz test to determine what 
constitutes a mineral.42 
Additionally, the Seversons suggest the Court reformulate the 
certified question as allowed under the Ninth Circuit’s certification 
order.43 The Seversons argue the Court cannot properly answer the 
question posed because dinosaur fossils in general do not meet or fail the 
Heinatz test.44 Accordingly, the Seversons maintain that the proper 
 
30.  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 21.  
31. Id.  
32.  Id. at 6. 
33. 890 P.2d at 378. 
34.  Appellants’ Br. at 9 (citing Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & 
Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 380 (Mont. 1995)).  
35.  Id. (citing Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2009). 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id.  
38.  Id. at 17. 
39. Id. 
40.  Id. at 19. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 20. 
43.  Id. at 4 (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074).  
44.  Id. at 3. 
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analysis of a fossil’s mineral or non-mineral designation must be specific 
to the particular fossil.45 
 
2.  Montana’s Legislative Fix 
 
 Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Montana enacted 
legislation to “clarify [that] dinosaur bones and fossils are part of surface 
estate.”46 The Seversons note that while the statute applies retroactively, it 
does not apply to pending litigation; therefore, it should have no bearing 
on the Court’s decision.47 Moreover, the Seversons argue that the statute 
says nothing about the parties’ original intended allocation of the mineral 
estate nor their use of the word “mineral.”48 
 
3.  Policy Concerns  
 
Finally, the Seversons contend that the public policy arguments 
presented by the Murrays and their amici are unfounded and undermined 
by the new statute.49 One major concern raised by the opposition involved 
the impact to museum ownership of fossils.50 The Seversons argued that 
this perceived problem could only occur under a specific five-part series 
of events that, to date, has never been an issue.51 Additionally, Montana’s 
two-year statute of limitations would also greatly mitigate such concerns.52 
Second, the Seversons claim that recognizing valuable fossils as 
minerals would not hamper paleontological research.53 The Seversons 
compare fossil exploration to that of oil and gas, which is not impeded by 
the need to acquire permission from both mineral and surface estate 
owners.54 Finally, the Seversons counter the argument that the “rare and 
exceptional” distinction is unworkable.55 They point to Farley, where the 
Court used the distinction to show that sand and limestone could either 
pass or fail the Heinatz test depending on their specific qualities.56 
Accordingly, the Seversons submit that dinosaur fossils should be treated 
no differently than fossil fuels for the sake of ownership.57 
 
45.  Id. at 4. 
46.      Mont. Code Ann. § 1–4–112 (2019).  
47. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 16. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Appellants’ Br., at 24. 
50.  Id.  
51. Id.  
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. at 25. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. at 26.  
56.  Id. (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 381). 
57.      Id.  
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B.  Appellees’ Argument 
The Murrays respond with three main points. First, the Court must 
not view the certified question as applying specifically to the Montana 
Fossils, and thus should deem all fossils as non-mineral.58 Second, the 
Court should consider H.B. 229 as indicative of what Montanans consider 
to qualify as minerals, and rule accordingly.59 Third, including fossils in 
the mineral estate would have dangerous public policy ramifications.60   
 
1.  Heinatz Test  
 
The Murrays first question Montana’s adoption of the Heinatz 
test. They argue the Seversons misstated relevant Montana mineral law by 
asserting that the Farley Court adopted the Heinatz test.61 Instead, they 
argue the Farley Court began by looking at the statutory classification of 
scoria, and only looked to other jurisdictions because of inconsistent 
statutory definitions.62 Furthermore, the Murray’s assert that the Farley 
Court merely mentioned the “rare and exceptional test,” but did not apply 
it.63 Additionally, the Murrays state that since deeds are interpreted like 
contracts, the Court should look solely at the four corners of the 
document.64 Therefore, dinosaur fossils should not be included, since they 
are not expressly mentioned in the mineral deed.65 
 To the extent Montana has adopted the Heinatz test, the Murrays 
alternatively argue that it requires the substance to have been “specifically 
. . . defined as a ‘mineral’ under applicable Montana statute.”66 If doubt 
remains whether the material is considered a “mineral,” the Murrays argue 
that the Court should apply the “rare and exceptional test.”67 Because 
fossils have never been considered a mineral in any common parlance or 
technical sense, the Murrays contend the Court should not advance to the 
rare and exceptional analysis.68 
 The Murrays also point to an additional factor mentioned in 
Heinatz: the impact of mineral excavation on the surrounding landscape.69 
Much like the limestone at issue in Heinatz, fossil discovery requires the 
excavator to follow fragments and scrape away the surface of the land.70 
 
58.    Appellees’ Br. at 9, July 31, 2019, No. OP 19-0304.  
 59.      Id. at 2. 
60. Id. 
 61.  Id. at 9 (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 380). 
 62.  Id. at 9. 
63.  Id. at 24. 
64. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 82–4–303(9) (2019)). 
65.  Id. at 10.  
66.  Id.  
67. Id. at 17. 
68.  Id. at 14. 
69.  Id. at 15 (citing Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 1000 
(Tex. 1949)). 
  70.      Id. 
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Therefore, the Murrays urge the Court to consider the significant impact 
of fossil extraction on the surface estate.71 
Next, the Murrays disagree that the “rare and exceptional test” can 
apply to a specific object within a class of substances.72 They state that the 
test cannot operate in isolation; therefore, the Court must look at all fossils 
when making a decision.73 Further, they state that no court has ever looked 
at an individual substance or subset and determined that it met the rare and 
exceptional test.74 
The Murrays then propose a “true test” for determining if 
substances qualify as minerals.75 This test looks at what “mineral” is 
understood to mean in the vernacular of the resource extraction industry, 
commercial world, and specific landowners.76 The Montana Fossils would 
fail under such a test, since fossils have never been understood by the 
resource extraction industry, commercial world, or landowners to 
constitute minerals.77 
Finally, the Murrays critique the Seversons’ representation of the 
Ninth Circuit’s certification order.78 The certified question asks if fossils, 
in general, are part of the mineral estate.79 This contradicts the Seversons’ 
argument that the Montana Fossils deserve a focused analysis. 
Accordingly, the Murrays argue that the Court’s analysis should apply to 
all dinosaur fossils, regardless of their value.80 
 
2.  Montana’s Legislative Fix 
 
While the Murrays concede that H.B. 229 has no bearing on the 
case, they note the unanimous support for the legislation indicates the will 
of the Montana people.81 Further, the Murrays argue widespread support 
for the law demonstrates that Montanans have never considered dinosaur 
fossils part of the mineral estate.82 
 
3.  Impact on Precedent  
 
Lastly, the Murrays urge the Court to observe the potential public 
policy impacts of their ruling.83 While the Court’s decision will not impact 
 
71.      Id. at 15–16.  
72.  Id. at 24–25.  
73.  Id. at 25.  
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. (citing Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla.  
1964) (holding that sub-surface water was not intended to be conveyed under 
the transfer of the mineral estate)). 
76. Id.  
77. Id.   
78. Id. at 30–31.  
79.  Id. (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074).. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id. at 35. 
82.   Id. 
83.  Id.  
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Montana law, it may be followed by other states without legislation 
addressing dinosaur fossils and mineral rights.84 Furthermore, the Murrays 
note the impracticality of the rare and exceptional test, stating that many 
fossils require significant excavation before their value can be 
determined.85 Accordingly, it would be impractical to create a distinction 
between mineral and non-mineral fossils.86 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 The Court will likely apply the natural and ordinary test to 
determine that dinosaur fossils are not minerals for the sake of a mineral 
estate. The parties do not contest that fossils are composed of Francolite 
and that Francolite is properly classified as a mineral.87 But the mere 
presence of minerals in a substance does not satisfy the natural and 
ordinary test; otherwise all dirt and water would qualify as a mineral. 
Montana law expressly permits the use of statutory and dictionary 
definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of a contract term.88 
Therefore, the Court will likely consider these definitions of the term 
“mineral” to determine if fossils qualify for the sake of the Severson 
mineral estate. The result of such consideration will yield that no Montana 
or federal statutory definition includes dinosaur fossils within the meaning 
of “mineral” in any context.89  
Moreover, there is a critical distinction between this situation and 
Farley. In Farley, the Court first looked at the statutory classification of 
scoria and, finding that it was expressly included in one definition of 
mineral and ambiguous in another, the Court chose to continue to the rare 
and exceptional analysis.90 Here, the Court will likely view the absence of 
statutory and dictionary definitions of “fossils” as evidence that fossils fall 
outside the natural and ordinary meaning of the term mineral.  
If the Court determines that fossils are minerals in a natural and 
ordinary sense, they will likely grant the Seversons’ request to reformulate 
the certified question.91 The “rare and exceptional” language from Heinatz 
requires that the Court look at a specific object within a category of 
substances. Despite the Murrays’ argument that the test should apply 
categorically to all fossils, prior cases demonstrate a clear intent for non-
categorical application. Heinatz held that in order for common substances 
like limestone and sand to become valuable they must contain unique 
attributes, such as a conducive composition for making glass or cement.92 
 
84.  Id.  
85.  Id.  
86.  Id. at 37–38.  
87. Appellants’ Br. at 7. 
88. Appellees’ Br. at 20–21 (citing Ravalli County. v. Erickson, 
85 P.3d 772, 774 (Mont. 2004)). 
89. Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1205.  
90. Farley, 890 P.2d at 379. 
91.  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4. 
92.  Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997. 
2019 PREVIEW: MURRAY V. BEJ MINERALS, LLC  9 
Further, the Farley Court held that sand is typically not rare or exceptional 
but can qualify if it is valuable for making glass.93  The majority opinion 
from Murray II clarified that the Farley Court obviously intended for the 
Heinatz test to be applied non-categorically, and for the outcome to be 
dependent on the rare and valuable nature of the particular substance.94 If 
the Court chooses to apply the Heinatz test non-categorically, specifically 
focusing on the Montana Fossils, there is no question that they would 
satisfy the rare and exceptional requirement. Therefore, if the Court 
determines that fossils are minerals in a natural and ordinary sense, it will 
likely reformulate the certified question and rule in favor of the Seversons.   
The Court will also likely consider the public policy concerns 
raised by the parties. Despite the Seversons’ claim to the contrary, fossil 
exploration differs vastly from that of oil and gas.95 Clayton Phipps, the 
amateur paleontologist who initially discovered the Montana Fossils, 
admits that finding fossils is unscientific and mostly a matter of luck.96 
Fossil discovery primarily involves “walking, riding, or driving around to 
see if there are any bones lying around or sticking out of the ground.”97 
Given Montana’s heightened sense of privacy, unfettered exploration 
would be problematic. Unrestrained exploration could run counter to the 
property rights recognized by Montana, particularly the implied covenant 
of quiet enjoyment. 
The Court may also consider the potential disruption that could 
occur from a fossil dig. The Heinatz Court excluded limestone from the 
mineral estate primarily due to impacts from the extraction process.98 Like 
limestone strip mining, fossil excavations can include many individuals 
and encompass hundreds of acres. Such disruptions would interfere with 
farmers and ranchers who depend on their land for their livelihood. While 
surface estate owners would be entitled to compensation under Montana 
statute, many Montana landowners would likely find that this type of 
lifestyle interference cannot be satisfied by monetary damages.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Given the existing case precedent and public policy ramifications, 
the Court will likely conclude that the Montana Fossils properly belong to 
the Murrays. While the holding of this case may not impact Montana law 
regarding fossil ownership, it may establish useful jurisprudence for 
surrounding states that have not yet passed an applicable statute. However, 
the Court’s decision will nonetheless greatly impact the two families who 
stand to gain considerable wealth or be left with nothing.     
         
     
 
93.      Farley, 890 P.2d at 380. 
94. Murray II, 908 F.3d at 447 (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 380). 
95.  Appellants’ Br. at 26. 
96.  Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
97.  Id.  
98.  Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997.  
